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Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect†
By Paul Niehaus and Sandip Sukhtankar*
Theoretical work on disciplining corrupt agents has emphasized
the role of expected future rents—for example, efficiency wages. Yet
taken seriously this approach implies that illicit future rents should
also deter corruption. We study this “golden goose” effect in the
context of a statutory wage increase in India’s employment guarantee scheme, comparing official microrecords to original household
survey data to measure corruption. We estimate large golden goose
effects that reduced the total impact of the wage increase on theft
by roughly 64 percent. In short, rent expectations matter. (JEL D73,
D82, H83, J41, K42, O17, O21)

D

isciplining corrupt officials is a key governance challenge in developing countries.1 In an influential early analysis, Becker and Stigler (1974) argued that if
there is some chance of detecting and dismissing corrupt agents then the principal
can mitigate the problem by paying an efficiency wage. Intuitively, agents have an
incentive to cheat less today in order to improve their chances of earning a wage
premium (or pension) tomorrow. Subsequent work has maintained this emphasis on
contracts designed to offer future rents.2
In contrast, the literature has put less emphasis on the role played by expectations
of illicit future rents. This paper focuses explicitly on the dynamic trade-off between
extracting rents today and improving one’s chances of surviving to extract rents
tomorrow. We call this latter motive the “golden goose” effect to reflect the idea that
* Niehaus: Department of Economics, University of California at San Diego, 9500 Gillman Drive #0508, San
Diego, CA 92093 (e-mail: pniehaus@ucsd.edu); Sukhtankar: Department of Economics, Dartmouth College, 326
Rockefeller Hall, Hanover, NH 03755 (e-mail: sandip.sukhtankar@dartmouth.edu). We thank Nageeb Ali, Eric
Edmonds, Edward Glaeser, Roger Gordon, Claudia Goldin, Gordon Hanson, Larry Katz, Asim Khwaja, Michael
Kremer, Sendhil Mullainathan, Ben Olken, Rohini Pande, Andrei Shleifer, Jonathan Zinman, and seminar participants at Harvard, Yale, BREAD, Stanford, the World Bank, CGD, UNH, Indian Statistical Institute-Delhi,
NEUDC-Boston University, Dartmouth, and UCSD for helpful comments. Thanks also to Manoj Ahuja, Arti
Ahuja, and Kartikian Pandian for generous hospitality and insight into the way NREGS operates in practice, and
to Sanchit Kumar for adept research assistance. We acknowledge funding from the National Science Foundation
(grant SES-0752929), a Harvard Warburg Grant, a Harvard CID Grant, and a Harvard SAI Tata Summer Travel
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†
Go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.5.4.230 to visit the article page for additional materials and author disclosure
statement(s) or to comment in the online discussion forum.
1
Recent work has shown how corruption constrains redistribution (Reinikka and Svensson 2004; Olken 2006),
creates new market distortions (Sequeira and Djankov 2010), and hinders efforts to remedy existing ones (Bertrand
et al. 2007).
2
See Cadot (1987), Andvig and Moene (1990), Besley and McLaren (1993), Mookherjee and Png (1995), and
Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), among others. Becker and Stigler’s (1974) model is a multi-period one but they
examined a contract that entirely eliminates illicit rents. As we discuss below, the literature on electoral discipline
is an important exception.
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agents want to preserve “the goose that lays the golden eggs” (unlike the deplorably
myopic farmer in the fable).3 We show that incorporating the golden goose effect
into standard models tends to weaken or even overturn the usual comparative statics
because of a generic tendency for static and dynamic effects to offset each other.4
To assess the relevance of this mechanism we gathered data from India’s largest rural welfare program, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(NREGS). The scheme entitles every rural household in India to up to 100 days
of paid, on-demand employment per year; it is also of intrinsic interest given that
it covers roughly 11 percent of the world’s population. We obtained disaggregated
official records on participation, including the names and addresses of participating
households, the duration of each spell of employment, and the amount of compensation paid. We then independently surveyed a sample of these (alleged) beneficiaries
to document the amounts of work actually done and payments actually received.
The gap between official and actual payments—which includes both overreporting
of days and underpayment of wages—is the primary form of corruption we study.5
Testing for golden goose effects requires an exogenous source of variation in
anticipated rent-extraction opportunities. We exploit a policy change: a May 1,
2007 increase in the statutory wage due to program participants in the state of
Orissa. A higher statutory wage means more lucrative corruption opportunities for
officials, since they receive more money for every fictitious day of work reported.
Importantly, the wage reform was enacted by policymakers well removed from the
officials we study, making it plausibly exogenous. Because the wage increase was
specific to the state of Orissa we can also use data from the neighboring state of
Andhra Pradesh as a control in some specifications.
Interestingly, the effects of a wage change on daily-wage overreporting turn
out to be theoretically ambiguous. There is an obvious static price effect: officials
receive more money for every day of wage work they report, strengthening their
incentives to overreport. If the wage increase were temporary this would be the
only effect. Following a permanent change, however, there is also a dynamic golden
goose effect: officials anticipate a more lucrative future, weakening their incentives
to overreport.
To separate out golden goose effects we exploit the fact that compensation on
roughly 30 percent of the NREGS projects in our sample was based on piece rates
rather than a daily wage. This heterogeneity reflects the fact that piece rates could
not be implemented on some projects where output was hard to measure. Because
the schedule of projects had been fixed in advance of the May 1, 2007 wage change,
and because piece-rate schedules were not revised along with the daily wage, the
wage change should not have directly affected piece-rate projects. Officials who
were managing piece-rate projects at the time of the wage change often had wage
projects planned in the near future, however, and thus experienced a shift in their
future rent expectations. This effect should also have been stronger in proportion to
3
Our usage differs from McMillan (2001), who uses “golden goose” to describe ex ante investments by individuals that a government may hold up ex post. Commitment will not be an issue in our setting.
4
Note that the framework here is one of observed types, as opposed to the career concerns framework in which
the agent wishes to influence future perceptions of his ability (or honesty) (Holmström 1999).
5
On the importance of measuring corruption directly, rather than using perceptions, see Olken (2009).
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the share of upcoming projects that were daily wage. Theory thus predicts that the
wage increase should (i) reduce theft from piece-rate projects, and (ii) differentially
reduce corruption in villages with more daily-wage projects upcoming.
We take these predictions to panel data on corruption before and after the policy
shock in 215 panchayats (villages). The data suggest that prices do matter: when
statutory daily wages increase, officials report more fictitious work on wage projects. Overall, the daily-wage increase from Rs 55 to Rs 70 (combined with secular
trends) increased the cost to the government per dollar received by beneficiaries
from $4.08 to $5.03. We also find evidence consistent with golden goose effects.
First, theft on piece-rate projects in Orissa declined after the shock, both in absolute
terms and relative to neighboring Andhra Pradesh. Second, both daily-wage overreporting and piece-rate theft fell differentially (the former significantly) in villages
that subsequently executed a higher share of daily-wage projects. While some of
the point estimates are imprecise, so that magnitudes should be interpreted cautiously, they suggest large golden goose effects. Rough calculations imply that theft
increased by 64 percent less than it would have had the wage increase been temporary. This point estimate need not be externally valid for other settings, of course; we
merely emphasize that dynamics appear to play a large role even in a setting where
tenure is typically quite short.
To separate our interpretation from other substitution mechanisms we test for
time-symmetry. Intuitively, most substitution mechanisms imply that the effects of
future rent expectations should be similar to the effects of past and current rent realizations. For example, if the marginal value of rents is decreasing so that officials
become “satiated” then both past and future windfalls should decrease current rent
extraction. Empirically we find a consistent negative relationship with future rentextraction opportunities, but an inconsistent relationship with past rent-extraction
opportunities. We also analyze data on visits by superior officials to rule out confounding changes in monitoring intensity.
Our analysis has four main implications for anticorruption policy. First, it provides evidence in support of the broad hypothesis that future rents matter, which is
at the heart of the efficiency wage concept. As Olken and Pande (2012) discuss, government wages have received a great deal of attention, yet the empirical evidence
has been limited to cross-country regressions and to the indirect test in Di Tella and
Schargrodsky (2003) who study the differential effects of an audit crackdown. We
simply exploit variation in expectations of illicit as opposed to licit rents to test the
same underlying mechanism.6
Second, our data suggest that optimal contracts should take illicit as well as licit
rents into account. Comparing what we know about the compensation of officials
we study to our estimates of corruption implies that their illicit earnings are orders
of magnitude greater than their licit wage (150 to 1,100 times wages), let alone
their wage premium. Calculations that leave out these illicit rents are unlikely to
hit the mark.
6
As some NREGS officials are elected the results can also be read as supporting theories of electoral discipline in which voters must allow politicians some future rents in order to maintain control over them (Barro 1973;
Ferejohn 1986; Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 1997; Ahlin 2005; Ferraz and Finan 2011).
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Third, our data suggest that concerns about the “displacement” effects of anticorruption work should be taken seriously. As Yang (2008) discusses, the possibility that cracking down on one kind of corruption may lead to increases in other
kinds has been widely discussed but rarely tested. Our data support this hypothesis.
Indeed, the golden goose mechanism generates displacement generically: any use
of the “stick” that reduces future rent expectations also makes the “carrot” of job
security less motivating. The analysis thus complements Yang’s model based on
nonconvexities in lawbreaking.
Finally, our results suggest that policy pilots should be interpreted carefully in
weakly institutionalized settings. Simply put, a pilot generates different dynamic
incentives than permanent implementation. For example, distributing welfare benefits once does not generate future rent expectations, while distributing them repeatedly does; a pilot may therefore appear to perform artificially poorly. Auditing once
does not reduce future rent expectations, while a regular program of audits does; a
pilot may therefore appear to perform artificially well. Generally speaking, expectations matter for interpreting results on monitoring (Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2003;
Nagin et al. 2002; Olken 2007) and on transparency more generally (Reinikka and
Svensson 2005; Ferraz and Finan 2008).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section I describes the NREGS context, Section II lays out the theoretical framework, Section III describes data collection and estimation equations, Section IV presents results, and Section V concludes.
I. Contextual Background on the NREGS

India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (now called the “Mahatma
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act”) is a landmark effort to redistribute income to the rural poor. The program was launched in February 2006 in
the poorest 200 districts in India and as of April 2008 covers the entire country
(604 rural districts). The total proposed budget allocation for the April 2010–March
2011 fiscal year is Rs 401 billion (US$ 8.9 billion), which is 0.73 percent of 2008
GDP.7 It is likely that the steady-state cost will be higher as implementation is still
incomplete in many parts of the country. The following discussion describes the
program as it was implemented during our study period; some of the procedures
described may have changed.
A. Statutory Operational Procedures
Each operational program cycle begins before the start of a fiscal year, when local
governments at the Gram Panchayat (GP or panchayat, lowest level of administration in the Indian government, comprising of a group of villages) and block (intermediate level of government between GPs and districts) levels plan a “shelf  ” of
projects to be undertaken during the upcoming year. The particular types of project
7
Costs: http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2010-11/bh/bhi.pdf. GDP: http://mospi.nic.in/4_gdpind_cur.pdf. The central government must by law contribute at most 90 percent of total expenditure, the rest of the funding coming from
the states.
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Figure 1. Distribution of Project Types
Notes: Plots distribution of projects in study panchayats by the fraction of spells of (reported)
work done that were daily wage spells. Work spells are coded as daily wage spells if the payment per day is one of the statutory daily wages. (Orissa implements four different daily wages
for varying skill levels).

allowed under the NREGS are typical of rural employment projects: road construction and earthworks related to irrigation and water conservation predominate.
Projects also vary in the payment scheme they utilize: NREGS workers can be
paid either on a daily-wage or a piece-rate basis depending on the practicality of
measuring output. There are broad categories of projects that are paid on piece rate as
opposed to daily wage; for example all irrigation/water conservation projects which
involve digging ditches are piece rate, while all road construction/paving projects are
daily wage. Empirically it is the case that all the work done on any particular project
is generally compensated in the same manner (see Figure 1). Consequently, there are
identifiable daily-wage projects and piece-rate projects. While according to statute
the project shelf should be proposed by village assemblies (Gram Sabhas), in practice higher up officials at the block and district level suggest and approve the shelf.
A key feature of the NREGS is that it is an unrestricted entitlement program:
every household in rural India has a right to 100 days of paid employment per year,
with no eligibility requirements.8 To obtain work on a project, interested households
must first apply for a jobcard.9 The jobcard contains a list of household members,
some basic demographic information, and blank spaces for recording work and payment history. In principle, any household can obtain a jobcard for free at either the
panchayat or block administrative office. Jobcards in hand, workers can apply for
work at any time. The applicant must be assigned to a project within 15 days after
submitting the application; if not they are eligible for unemployment compensation.
Applicants have no influence over the choice of project.
Officials thus do not have an opportunity cost of allocating work to workers, as in Banerjee (1997).
Since each household is limited to 100 days of employment per year, the definition of a household is important. In NREGS guidelines a household is “a nuclear family comprising mother, father, and their children, and may
include any person wholly or substantially dependent on the head of the family” (Ministry of Rural Development
2006).
8
9
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At the work sites the panchayat officials record attendance (in the case of dailywage projects) or measure output (in the piece-rate case). They record this information both in workers’ jobcards and in muster rolls which are sent to block offices
and digitized. The state and central governments reimburse local governments on
the basis of these electronic records. Most workers in our study area received their
wages in cash from the panchayat administration, although efforts to pay them
through banks are under way. As a transparency measure, all the official microdata
on payments have been made publicly available through a web portal maintained by
the central Ministry of Rural Development (http://nrega.nic.in).
B. Implementing Officials
The officials in charge of implementing the program are mainly appointed
bureaucrats at the block (Block Development Officers, Junior Engineers, Assistant
Engineers) and panchayat (Panchayat Secretary, Field Assistants, Mates, etc.) levels,
with the exception of the elected chairman of the Gram Panchayat (the “Sarpanch”).
district level program officials, including the District Collector, oversee block officials’ work. While in principal officials can be fired, suspended, or removed from
their jobs for misconduct, Article 311(2) of the Indian constitution says that no civil
servant can be dismissed without an official inquiry, which makes it difficult to fire
someone outright in practice. Suspensions and transfers into backwater jobs, however, are common punishments (Das 2001).
Because our analysis revolves around forward-looking optimization, it is useful
to understand bureaucratic tenure in these jobs. Tenure for elected Sarpanchs is five
years. Tenure for appointed bureaucrats is typically shorter, primarily because transfers are used as a disciplinary tool and as a way for political parties to bestow favors.
Iyer and Mani (2009) document that the district-level Indian Administrative Service
(IAS) officers who oversee local officials stay in a job for a year and a half on average,
and since they often move with their staff this implies that the tenure of lower-level
officials is at least as short. In Gujarat, Block Development Officers keep that post for
an average of sixteen months (de Zwart 1994, 94). Given the small but significant pay
differential between private sector and public sector jobs at this level (Das 2001) and
the short tenure, local public officials often seek opportunities for extracting rents.
C. Rent Extraction, Monitoring, and Enforcement
Officials’ opportunities for illicit gain include control over project selection;
bribes for obtaining jobcards and/or employment; and embezzlement from the
materials and labor budgets. We focus on theft from the labor budget, which we can
cleanly measure. The labor budget is required by law to exceed 60 percent of total
spending, and in fact we find that theft in this category is so extensive that even if all
of the 40 percent allocated to materials were stolen, the labor budget would still be
the larger source of illegal rents.10
10
We also found that bribes paid to obtain jobcards are uncommon (17 percent report paying positive amounts)
and small (averaging Rs 10 conditional on being positive).
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Theft from the labor budget comes in two conceptually distinct forms. First, officials can underpay workers for the work they have done (theft from beneficiaries).
Second, officials can overreport the amount of work done when they send their
reports up the hierarchy (theft from taxpayers). For example, a worker who worked
for ten days on a daily-wage project when the statutory minimum wage was Rs 55
per day might receive only Rs 45 per day in take-home pay. The official might report
that the worker had worked for 20 days rather than ten. His total rents would then
equal 55 ⋅ 20 − 45 ⋅ 10 = 650 rupees, the sum of the two sorts of theft.
A key difference between theft from beneficiaries and theft from taxpayers lies
in the way they are monitored. Underpaid workers who know they are underpaid
could either complain to someone at the block or district headquarters or simply
leave for the private sector. On the other hand, workers have less incentive to monitor overreporting: because the program’s budget is not fixed, a rupee stolen through
overreporting does not mean a rupee less for the workers. In principal the NREGS
Operational Guidelines address this issue by calling both for bottom-up monitoring
via Gram Sabhas (village meetings), local Vigilance and Monitoring Committees,
and biannual “social audits,” and also top-down monitoring via inspection of works
by superior officials (100 percent of works checked by block officials, 10 percent
by district officials, and 2 percent by state officials). The guidelines do not provide
incentives for auditing or link audit results to budget allocations, however. In practice there was no systematic audit process in Orissa during the period we study (in
contrast with, for example, the setting in Olken 2007). What top-down monitoring
did exist consisted primarily of informal tracking and worksite visits by officials.
For example, some block and district officials we interviewed use the NREGS’s
management information system to track aggregate quantities of work done on various projects and compare these to technical estimates or their own best guesses of
the resources required.
Officials caught cheating face a positive but small probability of getting punished.
Program guidelines call for “speedy action against [corrupt] officials” but do not lay
out specific penalties. In practice the most likely penalty is suspension or transferal
to a less desirable job; for elected officials it is loss of office. The Chief Minister at
one point claimed to have initiated action against nearly half the Block Development
Officers in the state, but some of this is likely political posturing.11 A more reliable
source may be the records of OREGS-Watch, a loose online coalition of nongovernmental organizations that monitor NREGS in Orissa; their reports note numerous instances of officials being caught and suspended (http://groups.google.co.in/
group/oregs-watch). The common pattern in these cases was incontrovertible proof
brought to the office of the District Collector, followed immediately by the suspension of the guilty official and in some cases by the recovery of the stolen funds. In
one case in Boudh district, for example, the offending official was caught within
two weeks of the misdemeanor, the money recovered and the official suspended.12

11
12

http://www.orissadiary.com/Shownews.asp?id=6201.
http://www.dailypioneer.com/59458/Action-taken-after-study-finds-fake-muster-roll-in-Boudh.html.
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D. Wage Setting
Our estimation strategy exploits an increase in statutory program wages in the
eastern state of Orissa in 2007. Such wage hikes were common due to the incentives
generated by the NREGS’s funding pattern. The central (federal) government pays
100 percent of the unskilled labor budget, and 75 percent of the materials budget
(defined to include the cost of skilled labor) (Ministry of Law and Justice, 2005).
The states, however, set wages and piece rates. This provision creates strong incentives for state politicians to raise wage rates, benefiting their constituents at the
central government’s expense.
We study the effects of a change in the statutory daily wage for unskilled workers in Orissa from Rs 55 to Rs 70. This change was announced on April 28, 2007
and went into effect on May 1, 2007. Importantly, this policy change did not
directly affect payments on piece-rate projects, and it was specific to Orissa (did
not affect neighboring Andhra Pradesh).13 Note that wages for three categories of
higher-skilled labor were also raised on May 1 from Rs 65/75/85 to Rs 80/90/100.
Because skilled wages are rarely reported in our data (6.5 percent of work spells)
and their use varies primarily within-project (65 percent of the variation), we focus
our theoretical discussion around a single-wage rate.
II. Dynamic Rent Extraction

Following Becker and Stigler (1974), a large theoretical literature has studied the
use of dismissal threats to motivate corruptible agents. Dismissal typically matters
in these models because agents who are not dismissed expect to receive compensation greater than their outside option—a wage premium or a pension, for example.
In a dynamic setting, however, an agent’s expected future rents include both an
exogenous licit component provided by the contract and also an endogenous illicit
component determined by their own future corrupt behavior. For example, an official thinking about whether to take a bribe today will rationally take into account the
bribe revenue he expects to earn tomorrow. In this section, we develop a dynamic
model to examine the role that such expectations play in decision making. We specialize the framework to our context by modeling the kinds of corruption that we see
in our data but also comment on broader implications.
Time is discrete. An infinitely lived official and a group of N infinitely lived workers seek to maximize their discounted earnings stream:
∞

∑ β 
 τ−t yi  (τ),
(1) 	ui  (t) = 
τ =t

13
The NREGS implementation guidelines state that the states should “devise productivity norms for all the
tasks listed under piece-rate works for the different local conditions of soil, slope, and geology types in such a way
that normal work for the prescribed duration of work results in earnings at least equal to the wage rate.” In practice,
however, this occurs haphazardly and with long and variable lags. In Orissa wages were revised on May 1, 2007,
but the piece-rate schedule was not amended until August 16, 2007, a month and a half after our study period ends,
and at that time some rates were lowered rather than raised.
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where y i(τ) are the earnings of agent i in period τ. Additional players with identical
preferences wait in the wings to replace the official should he be fired.
In each period exactly one NREGS project is active. We abstract from simultaneous ongoing projects primarily to simplify the exposition; it is also true, however,
that most of the panchayats in our sample have either one or zero projects active at
all times during our study period. Let ω  t= 1 indicate that the active project at time t
is a wage project, and ω  t= 0 that it is a piece-rate project. We represent the “shelf”
of projects as an infinite stochastic stream of projects: at the beginning of each
period a random project is drawn from the shelf with
(2) 	

ϕ ≡ P (ω  t = 1 | ω  t−1, ω  t−2, …).

We suppose that all agents know ϕ but do not know exactly which projects will
be implemented in the future. At the cost of a small loss of realism, this approach
ensures that the dynamic environment is stationary and greatly simplifies the
expression of comparative statics. It also permits a close analogy between the
model and our empirical work, in which the fraction of future projects that are
daily wage (a measure of ϕ) plays a key role. We treat ϕ as exogenous here since
de jure it should be predetermined, but will also test below whether it responds to
the wage change.
Each worker inelastically supplies one indivisible unit of labor in each period.
We interpret a unit flexibly as either a day (in the case of daily-wage projects) or as
a unit of output (in the case of piece-rate projects). Labor may be expended on an
t
t
t
t
NREGS project or in the private sector, where worker i can earn w
_  (r_     ). Let n(q     )
be the number of days (output units) supplied to the project when ω
   t= 1 (ω  t= 0),
t
t
and let and w  i  (r  i    ) be the wage (piece rate) that participating worker i receives. This
_
_
need not equal the statutory wage w 
 (the statutory piece rate r  ).
NREGS wages and employment levels emerge from bargaining between the official and the workers. In principal workers have two sources of bargaining power:
they can threaten to complain if the official pays them less than the statutory rate
_ _
w 
w  t (r_  t   ). Which of these
 (r ), or can simply leave for the private sector and earn _
threat points matters in practice is of course an empirical question. In a companion
paper we study this issue in some detail; we find that the wages workers’ receive
bear little relationship to the statutory wage but closely track variation in local
market wages (Niehaus and Sukhtankar 2013). Motivated by these data, we model
w  tand
equilibrium wages and participation choices as tracking market wages (w  ti  = _
w  t  )). We further simplify matters by abstracting from time variation in the
nt= nt(_
t
market wage, so _
w  t= w
_and n= n.
Participation n and the average participant’s wage w (piece rate r) are thus predetermined once the official chooses how much work  n   tto report. If the current project
is a wage project, official’s period t rents will be
_

 	y  to   (ω  t = 1) = (w  − w) n +
3
Underpayment

and analogously if it is a piece-rate project,

_

( n t − n) w 
 ,
3
Overreporting
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_

 	y  to   (ω  t = 0) = (r  − r)
3

Underpayment

q +
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_

( q   t − q) r   .
3

Overreporting

_

_

The official can report up to n 
 > n work-days, where n 
 is the number of registered
workers in his village. Overreporting puts the official at risk of being detected by
a superior and removed from office. The probability of detection on daily-wage
projects is π( n , n). We study the case where π(n, n) = 0 for any n so that there is
no penalty for honesty, while π1  > 0 and π2  < 0 so that the probability of detection
increases as the gap between  n  and n widens. We also assume that π is such that the
official’s problem has an interior optimum. Finally, we assume that if n > n′ then
π((n + x), n) ≤ π((n′ + x), n′  ). This condition ensures that officials weakly prefer to
have more people work on the project; it would be satisfied if, for example, the probability of detection depended on the total amount of overreporting or on the average
rate of overreporting. The probability of detection on piece-rate projects is μ( q   t, q)
_
for q ≤  q  ≤ q  and has analogous properties. If an official is caught he is removed
from office before the beginning of the next period and earns a continuation payoff
normalized to zero. In practice corrupt officials are sometimes suspended rather than
fired; modeling this would affect our results only quantitatively.14, 15
The recursive formulation of the official’s objective function is
_ _

_

_

V   (w , ϕ) ≡ ϕV (w , 1, ϕ) + (1 − ϕ) V (w , 0, ϕ)
 	
_

_

_

_ _

 	V(w , 1, ϕ) ≡ max [ (w  − w) n + ( n  − n)  w  + β ( 1 − π ( n , nt   )) V   (w , ϕ) ]
 n 

_

_

_

_ _

 	V(w , 0, ϕ) ≡ max [ (r  − r) q + ( q  − q)  r  + β ( 1 − μ( q , q  t   )) V   (w , ϕ) ],
_

 q 

where V(w , 1) is the official’s expected continuation payoff in a period with a daily_
is his expected continuation payoff in a period with a piecewage project, V(w 
_, 0)
_
 ) is his expected continuation payoff unconditional on project
rate project, and V 
 (w 
type.
As a benchmark, consider first the effects of a hypothetical, temporary
_ increase
_
 , ϕ) is
in the statutory daily wage. Because the official’s continuation value V 
 (w 
unaffected by this change it strictly increases overreporting on daily-wage projects
( n   t− n). Intuitively, the wage change acts like a pure price shock for officials managing daily-wage projects: the value of overreporting a day of work goes up, while
the cost is unaffected. Consequently overreporting increases. Theft on piece-rate
_
projects ( q   t  r  − qr) does not change, on the other hand, since neither the costs nor
the benefits of stealing change.
14

Officials may also leave their posting for more benign reasons—a bureaucrat may be reassigned or a politician’s term may expire. Modeling this possibility would yield additional predictions: a bureaucrat near the end of
his term may have weaker incentives to avoid detection, as suggested by Olson (2000). Campante, Chor, and Do
(2009) provide a complementary analysis of the effects of exogenous changes in the probability of job retention.
Unfortunately, we do not observe variation in tenure and so for simplicity we omit it from the model.
15
We model π as independent of the daily wage and other program parameters since incentives for monitor_
ing are not linked to other program parameters in our context. In Section IVE, we directly test for effects of w 
 on
monitoring and do not find any evidence of a relationship.
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Now consider the effects of a permanent increase in the statutory daily wage.
Besides a static_price effect, this also has a dynamic effect on the official’s con_
 , ϕ). Interestingly, this effect can potentially reverse the model’s
tinuation value V 
 (w 
predictions for daily-wage overreporting. Whether it does hinges on the elasticity of
_
future rents with respect to w 
 .
_


Proposition
1: Overreporting  n   t− n on daily-wage projects is increasing in w 
_
_
∂ V 
w 
_ _
_
_ < 1 and decreasing otherwise.
if       ∂  w 
V 


Proof:
Proofs are deferred to Appendix A.
Intuitively, a higher wage raises the value of future overreporting, which in turn
increases the importance of keeping one’s job. This effect dominates the price effect
unless the elasticity of future benefits with respect to the wage is sufficiently small.16
While not easily refutable, Proposition 1 suggests two tests. First, we can examine the effects of a permanent wage change on forms of rent extraction that are not
directly affected, such as theft from piece-rate projects. A higher statutory wage has
no effect on current rent-extraction opportunities on piece-rate projects, but does
increase expected future rents and thus discourages theft:
_

_

 .
Proposition 2: Total theft from piece-rate projects ( q   t  r  − qr) is decreasing in w 
This result is particularly interesting since many mechanisms—in which different
kinds of corruption complement each other—could generate the opposite effect. For
example, successful embezzlement might require fixed investments such as paying
a superior officer to look the other way; in this case, an increase in the returns to
one form of corruption might lead to an increase in other forms as well. Ultimately
it is an empirical question whether alternative forms of corruption are substitutes or
complements.
A second test exploits variation in the relative intensity of price and golden goose
effects. Since the wage change only affects rents on future wage projects, we expect
to see stronger effects in places with more future wage projects upcoming (higher ϕ).
This turns out to be true if piece-rate and daily-wage projects are similarly lucrative:
Proposition 3: Restrict attention to any closed, bounded set of parameters
_ _
w, r_). Then for | yo(1) − yo(0) | sufficiently small,
(ϕ, w , r , _
∂  2  ( n   t − n)
 	 _
  
 
<0
_
∂  w   ∂ ϕ

_

∂  2  ( q   t  r  − qr)
and __
  
 
 
< 0.
_
∂  w   ∂ ϕ

The condition yo(1) ≃ yo(0) matters because without it changes in ϕ generate
“wealth effects” that can be additional sources of treatment heterogeneity. In our
16
One can in fact can go further and construct examples (available on request) in which the total amount stolen
per period decreases.
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empirical work we first verify that equilibrium rents from daily-wage and piecerate projects are similar, and then then test Proposition 3, using our data to estimate
categories of ϕ.
A. Effects of Wages and Monitoring
The results above characterize the effects of a wage reform to guide our empirical
work. Earlier work, on the other hand, has emphasized the probability of audit and
the official’s wage as key exogenous parameters. To relate our model to this literature we next characterize their effects.
To formalize the probability of an audit let π( n , n) = γ ˜π ( n , n), where γ is the
probability a daily-wage project is audited and ˜π  the conditional probability of conviction. Then one can show that a one-period increase in γ decreases overreporting
on daily-wage projects and has no effect on theft from piece-rate projects. A permanent increase in γ, on the other hand, generates a smaller decrease—or even an
increase—in daily-wage overreporting, and increases theft from piece-rate projects.
The contrast between these results yields a simple lesson for empirical work: the
right interpretation of empirical evidence on the effects of a crackdown depends on
whether officials perceived it to be temporary or permanent. In particular, temporary crackdowns generate larger reductions in corruption than permanent ones, and
should thus be interpreted cautiously as guides to policymaking.
Efficiency wages, on
the other hand, work here just as they would in a one-shot
_ _
_
_
 , ϕ) = ϕV(w , 1, ϕ) + (1 − ϕ)V(w , 0, ϕ) + W where W ≥ 0
game. To see this let V 
 (w 
is a wage premium paid to the official in each period until he is not dismissed. It is
straightforward to show that all forms of corruption are decreasing in W. Intuitively,
the efficiency wage has no price effects and only deterrent effects. As this example
illustrates the theory’s novel predictions hinge not on dynamics per se but on the
dynamic implications of future corrupt rents.
B. Alternative Substitution Mechanisms
Some of our framework’s implications could also be generated by alternative substitution mechanisms. We conclude our theoretical discussion with a brief overview
of these mechanisms and highlight a key distinction between them and the golden
goose effect: the latter predicts that only future rent expectations, and not past rent
realizations, affect current behavior. We will exploit this asymmetry below to examine which story best fits our data.
One possible substitution mechanism involves the “production function” for
corruption. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the bulk of corruption in our setting
simply involves writing one number on paper instead of another. Suppose, however, that this requires the use of some scarce input that can be shifted across time
(e.g., effort). Then the wage shock would induce officials to optimally reallocate
this input across time, giving rise to patterns similar to those we predict. Second, if
officials care about things other than consumption, then the wage shock might have
income effects. The expectation of large future rents would lower the expected relative marginal utility of income now, leading to lower corruption. In an extreme case
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of income effects officials might even “target” a particular income level. Finally,
empirical tests could potentially be sensitive to issues of time aggregation. In our
empirical work we treat the day as the basic unit of time, but monitoring might be
based on less frequent observations. This would mechanically imply that officials
expecting to steal more tomorrow would steal less today, since the probability of
detection would depend on the sum of today’s report and tomorrow’s.
One difference between the golden goose effect and these mechanisms is that the
former is purely forward-looking while the latter are time-symmetric, in that they predict that increases in both past and future corruption opportunities should reduce corruption today. Consider the “input” model: suppose that the official can extract rents
 t+1tomorrow only if f  (Rt  , Rt+1) ≤ 0 for some increasing function f.
Rt today and R
Clearly any factor that increases Rt+1must therefore decrease Rt  , generating what
might look like a golden goose effect. Similarly, however, any factor that increases
 t+1, so that shocks to lagged rent extraction also negatively effect
Rt must decrease R
rent extraction today. An analogous argument applies to the monitoring story (for
example, let the probability of an investigation be f  (Rt+ Rt+1)). Finally, consider
a simple model with income effects in which officials maximize U(Rt+ Rt+1) −
D(Rt  , Rt+1) where U is an increasing, concave function and D is the expected nonmonetary disutility of punishments. (The income-targeting story is a limited case of this
example.) Provided D12is not too negative, changes in D that lower the cost of Rt+1
will induce substitution away from Rt due to diminishing marginal utility (U″ < 0).
This also implies the converse, however.
III. Empirical Approach

A. Official Data
To test the theoretical predictions in Section II we adopt an audit approach, comparing official microdata on wage payments and program participation to original
household survey data collected from the same (alleged) beneficiaries. The official
data we use are publicly available on a central website (http://nrega.nic.in). Data
available at the level of the individual worker include names, ages, addresses, caste
status, and unique household jobcard number. Data available at the level of the work
spell include number of days worked, name and identification number of the project
worked on, and amount paid. Descriptive information on the nature of the projects
and the names of the officials responsible for implementation are also available. It
is straightforward to infer whether a project paid daily wages or piece rates because
there are only a few allowed daily-wage rates.17 (Figure 1).
We used as our sample frame the official records for the states of Orissa and
Andhra Pradesh as downloaded in January 2008, six months after our study period,
to allow time for all the relevant data to be uploaded. As a cross-check, we also
downloaded the official records a second time in March 2008. We found that the
records for Orissa remained essentially unchanged, but that the number of work

17

We designate a project as daily wage if more than 95 percent of the wages paid are these amounts.
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spells recorded for Andhra Pradesh increased by roughly 10 percent. These new
observations were spread uniformly across space and time and so do not appear to
have resulted from delays in processing records for specific panchayats or projects.
They do, however, generate some uncertainty about the representativeness of our
AP sample frame. We will emphasize the Orissa data and use AP as a control only
in Table 5.
We sampled from the list of officially recorded NREGS work spells during the
period March 1, 2007 to June 30, 2007 in Gajapati, Koraput, and Rayagada districts
in Orissa. Within these districts, we restricted our attention to blocks at the border
with AP. We sampled 60 percent of the Gram Panchayats within study blocks, stratified by whether the position of GP chief executive had been reserved for women.
(Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004 find evidence suggesting that reservations affect
levels of corruption). Within these panchayats we sampled 2.8 percent of work
spells, stratified by panchayat, by whether the project was implemented by the block
or the panchayat administration, by whether the project was a daily-wage or piecerate project, and by whether the work spell was before or after the daily-wage shock.
This yielded a total of 1,938 households. We set out to interview all adult members
of these households about their NREGS participation, so that our measures of corruption would not be affected if work done by one member was mistakenly reported
as having been done by another. Details on survey results and a sample description
are in Appendix B.
B. Survey Coverage
We asked respondents retroactively about spells of work they did between
March 1, 2007 and June 30, 2007. A spell of work is a well-defined concept within
the NREGS: it is an uninterrupted period of up to two weeks employment on a
single project. For each spell we asked subjects the dates during which they worked,
the number of days worked, what project they worked on, whether they were paid
on a piece-rate or daily-wage basis, what payment they received, and in the case
of piece-rate projects what quantity of work they did. In addition to the survey of
program participants, we also administered a separate questionnaire to village elders
with questions on labor market conditions, agricultural seasons, and official visits
in the village.
While imperfect recall could potentially be a concern given the lag between the
study period and our survey, we designed the survey instrument and trained enumerators to jog respondents’ memories: for example, using major holidays as reference points. The results were encouraging: we obtained information on at least
the month in which work was done for 93 percent of the spells in our sample. We
do not find significant differential recall problems over time: in a variety of specifications including location fixed effects and individual controls such as age and
education, subjects’ estimated probability of recalling exact dates increases by only
0.7 percent—2.2 percent per month and is not statistically significant. Since our
main tests exploit discrete time-series changes while controlling for smooth trends,
these patterns should not introduce bias. Subjects’ recall was facilitated by the fact
that the NREGS was a new and salient program, and spells of work were likely to
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be memorable and distinct compared to other employment. Subjects are also more
likely to keep track of their participation and compensation given that they do not
necessarily get paid what they are owed or on time. The one place where recall does
matter is that recipients do have difficulty recalling the quantity of work done on
piece-rate projects—the amount of earth they moved, volume of rocks they split,
etc. Consequently, in our empirical work, we treat theft on piece-rate projects as
_
unitary ( q   t  r  − q  tr  tin terms of the model).
Survey interviews were framed to minimize other potential threats to the accuracy and veracity of respondents’ self-reports. We made clear that we were conducting academic research and did not work for the government, to discourage them
from claiming fictitious underpayment; in the end most respondents reported that
they had been paid what they thought they were owed. None of the interviewed
households have income close to the taxable level and will have ever paid income
taxes, so there are no tax motives for underreporting. Conversely, officials had little
need to secure workers’ collusion in their overreporting. A worker could only supply a signature, which has little relevance when most people cannot write their own
name. There is also no reason to believe that respondents would underreport corruption for fear of reprisals, since they could not have known how many days they were
reported as having worked in the official data. Finally and most importantly, there
is no reason to think any of these issues would lead to differential biases (which
would affect our results) and not just level ones (which would not). Niehaus and
Sukhtankar (2013) confirms that the wage shock had no effect on the self-reported
variables we use in our analysis.
C. Empirical Specifications
Our empirical analysis includes all spells of work from our survey data that contain information on at least the month of the spell, the number of days worked,
and the wages received. We impute start or end dates if unavailable, and construct
time-series of survey reports of work done and wages paid by aggregating data at
the panchayat-day level for the sample period. We distribute days worked equally
over the month if neither start nor end date are available, and equally in the period
between the start date and end date if the number of days worked is less than the
period between the start and end dates. Table C1 gives a numerical example of the
construction of our dependent variables. Similarly, we construct time-series of the
official data by aggregating official reports of work done and wage paid of only those
households who we interviewed or confirmed as fictitious over the sample period.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the main outcome variables; the discrepancy between official and survey amounts is stark, but at leakage rates of around
75 percent within the range of corruption estimates across developing nations, other
programs in India, as well as other estimates of corruption in NREGS in Orissa.18
18
For example, Reinikka and Svensson (2004) find rates of 87 percent in a schooling program in Uganda, while
Ferraz, Finan, and Moreira (2012) find leakage of up to 55 percent in a schooling program in Brazil. In the Indian
context, Khera (2011) finds leakage rates of almost 90 percent in the flagship food subsidy program (TPDS) in
Bihar, while a study done by an NGO (Center for Science and Environment) on corruption in the NREGS in Orissa
found almost precisely the same numbers (75 percent).
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Table 1—Summary Statistics of Main Regression Variables

Official DW days
Actual DW days
Official PR payments
Actual PR payments
FwdWageFrac

Observations

Mean

SD

13,054
13,054
7,320
7,320
13,908

3.31
0.88
94.08
12.96
0.67

6.30
1.55
259.70
43.43
0.40

Notes: This table provides summary descriptions of the aggregated variables used in the main
result Tables 3 and 4. The sample for each kind of project includes panchayats that had at least
one of that kind of project active during the study period (March 1 through June 30, 2007).
“Official DW Days” is the days worked by panchayat-day on daily wage projects as reported
officially. “Actual DW Days” is the days worked by panchayat-day on daily wage projects as
reported by survey respondents. “Official PR Rate” is the total payments by panchayat-day on
piece-rate projects as reported officially, while “Actual PR Rate” corresponds to the same figure as reported by survey respondents. “FwdWageFrac” is the proportion of project-days in the
next two months in a panchayat that are daily wage.

Our first empirical strategy is to regress officially reported outcomes  y ptfor panchayat p and day t on actual outcomes ypt as reported by participants, an indicator
Shock  t for the post May 1 period, and a number of time-varying controls summarized by T
 t including a polynomial in day-of-year to capture long-term trends,
a polynomial in day-of-month to capture periodicity, and an indicator for major
holidays. Certain specifications also include regression-discontinuity type controls
where the Shock indicator is interacted with time trends. Finally, we include indicators for political reservations Rpand in some specifications district fixed effects δd(p)
to capture variation in program implementation across locations:19
(3) 	  y pt
  = β0  + β1 ypt
  + β2  Shock  t + T  ′t   γ + R  ′p   ζ + δd( p) + ϵpt.
Standard errors are clustered at the panchayat as well as the day level using multiway clustering. Note that if  y pt were correlated one-for-one with ypt, then this
  as the dependent variable, while if
approach would be equivalent to using  y pt− ypt
not our approach is less restrictive. We have also implemented the more restrictive
approach, however, and the results are if anything stronger (see Table 6 and the discussion in Section IVD).
Identification in (3) rests on the assumption that unobserved factors affecting   y pt are orthogonal to Shock  t after controlling for the other regressors. To relax
this assumption we also exploit data from the neighboring district of Vizianagaram
in Andhra Pradesh to control for unobserved time-varying effects common to the
geographic region under study. There are, however, several caveats. First, we can
only implement this strategy when studying piece-rate theft, since essentially all
projects in Andhra Pradesh are piece rate. Second, as noted above a substantial
number of new observations appeared in the official Vizianagaram records after we
selected our sample. Finally, Andhra Pradesh made two revisions to its schedule of
piece rates during our sample period, the latter of which took effect on March 25,
2007. Because of its proximity to the daily-wage change in Orissa this shock limits

19

Key political positions in some villages are reserved by law for women and/or ethnic minorities.
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the value of Andhra Pradesh as a control for high-frequency confounds, although it
is still useful for low-frequency ones. Keeping these limitations in mind, we estimate
  + β2  ORshock  t× ORp + β3  APShock1t× APp  
(4) 	  y pt = β0  + β1 ypt
+ 
β4  APShock 2t× APp   + β5  ORshock  t + β6  APShock 1t
 p) + ϵpt
 ,
+ β7  APShock 2t + ORp + T  ′t   γ + R  ′p   ζ + δd(
where ORp(APp  ) indicates panchayats in Orissa (Andhra Pradesh). The coefficient
of interest in this specification is β
 2, the differential change in corruption in the postshock period in Orissa.
To test for the differential effects of the wage change predicted by Proposition 3
we need an empirical analogue to ϕ, the probability that a future project in our
model is a daily-wage project. Given that many of the panchayats in our data only
implement wage projects, we partition the set of panchayats into those that do and
do not ever run piece-rate projects and estimate
  + β2  Shock  t + β3  Shockt× AlwaysDWpt  
(5) 	  y pt = β0  + β1 ypt
+ β4  AlwaysDWpt   + T  ′t   γ + R  ′p   ζ + δd(p) + ϵpt
 3  < 0. We can also
for daily-wage outcomes. Our model predicts β2  > 0 while β
apply a similar idea to piece-rate outcomes, replacing AlwaysDW with AlwaysPR.
In this case we expect β2  < 0 while β3  > 0.
While specification (5) has a simple differences-in-differences interpretation, we
can obtain a more stringest test of the theory by isolating the differential response
attributable only to future daily-wage projects. To do this we must define, for every
panchayat and every day, the proportion of upcoming work that is daily wage. We
accomplish this by (1) defining a “project-day” as a day on which a particular project is running, where a project is running if work on that project as been reported
in the past and will be reported in the future, and then (2) calculating for each
panchayat-day observation the fraction FwdWageFrac of project-days in the upcoming two months that are daily wage project-days. Figure 2 plots the distribution of
FwdWageFrac in our sample. Given the existence of clear mass points at zero and
one we adopt a flexible approach, binning the data into three categories: one where
FwdWageFrac = 0 (the omitted category), one where 0 < FwdWageFrac < 1
(FdwSome), and one where FwdWageFrac = 1 (FdwAll).20 We then allow the
effects of the wage change to vary across these categories:
 + β2  Shock  t+ β3  Shockt× FdwAllpt
 + β4  FdwAllpt

(6)   y pt= β0  + β1 ypt
 p)+ ϵpt.
+ β5  Shock  t× FdwSomept  + β6  FdwSomept  + T  ′t   γ + R  ′p   ζ + δd(
20
We have also estimated more restrictive models in which FwdWageFrac enters linearly and obtained qualitatively similar results (available on request).
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Fraction of future daily-wage projects
Figure 2. Distribution of Future Daily-Wage Project Fraction
Note: Plots distribution of projects in study panchayats by the fraction of projects in the subsequent two months that were daily-wage projects.

Note that a key goal in constructing these forward-looking measures is to capture variation in the proportion of daily-wage projects on the panchayat’s “shelf”
of projects without also including endogenous variation in the amount of work
reported. This is the reason that we focus on whether projects are ongoing, rather
than the number of person-days of work purportedly done. We show below that the
FwdWageFrac variable is indeed uncorrelated with the wage shock. It is also important to note that if it were endogenously related to the wage change we would expect
the resulting bias to work against us rather than for us: panchayats that increased
their corruption most in response to the shock would be the most likely to switch to
wage projects, generating a positive bias on the interaction term.
To provide more insight into whether past opportunities for corruption matter
in the same way as future opportunities, we construct bins based on an analogous
measure BkWageFrac of the fraction of project-days in the preceeding two months
that were daily wage and estimate:21
(7) 	  y pt
 = β0  + β1 ypt
 + β2  Shock  t+ β3  Shock  t× FdwAllpt+ β4  Shock  t× BdwAllpt
+ β5  Shock  t× FdwSomep  t+ β6  Shock  t× BdwSomep  t
 + β8  BdwAllpt
 + β9  FdwSomept  + β10
   BdwSomept  
+ β7  FdwAllpt
 + ϵpt
 .
+ T  ′t   γ + R  ′p   ζ + δd(p)
 4, while if time-symmetric
Our model predicts β
 3  < 0 with no prediction about β
mechanisms are important then we should see β3  ≃ β4   < 0.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the main variables used in our regressions.
21
The correlation between FwdWageFrac and BkWageFrac is 0.75 within district, 0.6 within blocks, and 0.11
within panchayats; between FwdWageFrac and the current daily-wage fractions, the correlations are 0.85, 0.76, and
0.41, respectively. The results must be interpreted with these correlations in mind.
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Figure 3. Daily-Wage Rates Paid
Notes: Plots a daily series of the average wage rate paid in daily-wage projects in Orissa over
the study period, according to official records and survey data. Day 60 corresponds to March 1,
2007, the start of the study period; day 121 to May 1, 2007, the date of the wage shock; and
day 181 to June 30, 2007, the end of the study period.

IV. Results: The Golden Goose Effect

A. Preliminaries: Wages, Projects, and Rents
We begin with tests of the main identifying assumptions. Figure 3 shows that the
policy change was actually implemented: the average wage rate officially claimed
on daily-wage projects hovers near Rs 55 until May 1 and then jumps up sharply
thereafter. Interestingly, it does not immediately or permanently reach the new statutory wage of Rs 70. This is because not all panchayats implemented the change—
some continued to claim the old rates after May 1, likely because they were not
immediately informed about the change.22, 23 We also examined changes in the use
of the “skilled” wage categories after May 1 and found a small decrease in the
proportion of wage spells for which skilled wages were claimed, from 7.5 percent
prior to May 1 to 6.3 percent after May 1. While we cannot reliably assess the “true”
skill level of any given spell, this decrease is consistent with the hypothesis that
there is some skill inflation going on and that golden goose effects led officials to do
less of it after the wage change.
Figure 3 also reveals that the wage rate actually received by workers was unaffected
by the shock; if anything it trends slightly downwards, though this effect is largely
compositional and disappears once we control for district effects. In a c ompanion
paper we examine the determination of actual wages in some detail (Niehaus and
Sukhtankar 2013). We find, inter alia, that while 72 percent of respondents were
22
In Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013), we show that panchayats that are closer to block and district offices are
more likely to implement the wage change.
23
This interpretation suggests an additional test: all our predictions should hold only in panchayats that actually
implemented the wage change. We pursued this strategy, but unfortunately there are insufficiently many nonimplementing panchayats for us to precisely estimate the difference.
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aware that the wage had changed and 81 percent of these correctly identified the new
wage, these “aware” workers did not earn higher wages after May 1 relative to their
less-aware peers. Similarly, literate workers were no more likely to see their wages
increase. For further analysis and interpretation of these facts we refer the reader to
Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013); our analysis here will focus on testing our theoretical predictions about overreporting, taking the observed wage dynamics as given.24, 25
Second, we check whether preshock rent extraction from daily-wage and piecerate projects are similar, as predicated by Proposition 3. Dividing total theft in the
two categories of projects by the number of actual days worked on those projects,
we find that the rate of theft per day worked is very similar preshock; Rs 236 per
actual day worked in daily-wage projects as opposed to Rs 221 in piece-rate projects.26 This is important both because it allows us to test Proposition 3 and also
because it implies that officials would have had little incentive to distort project
types prior to the wage change.
Finally, we check whether project shelf composition responds endogenously to
the wage shock. In principal it is fixed at the start of the fiscal year (March 2007),
but if officials had scope to reclassify or re-order projects they might have prioritized wage projects. In fact, the fraction of projects that are daily wage fell from
74 percent before May 1 to 72 percent afterwards. More formally, Table 2 reports
regressions of FwdWageFrac on an indicator for the shock along with time controls.
The point estimates are insignificant and correspond to a 0.02 standard deviation
change in project composition. These results corroborate the testimony of blocklevel officials that the shelf of projects and payment schemes is predetermined. They
are also natural given that changing the designation of project is a relatively observable form of cheating.
In unreported results we also examined whether project shelf composition is correlated with key political variables like reservations for women and minorities at the
sarpanch and samiti representative level; with the number of locally active NGOs;
with village elders’ perceptions of the relative wealth and relative political activism
of the village; and with indicators for visits from block and district officials. In general we found no significant correlations; the one exception we uncovered was the
correlation with the share of the population belonging to scheduled castes, and since
very few scheduled castes live in our study area this explains very little variation
in the shelf. We have also included these characteristics directly as controls in our
regressions and they do not change our findings (available on request).
24
Another intriguing feature of Figure 3 is that during the first month of our study period workers were on
average overpaid. This pattern is driven by observations from Gajapati district where prevailing market wages were
higher than the statutory program wage. If officials do not pay this prevailing market wage, workers will not participate in the program. If workers do not participate, officials cannot extract rents. Hence, according to local NGOs,
officials in such areas overpay workers for participation, even though they report the correct statutory program wage
on official reports, making up the difference by overreporting days worked.
25
Cross-sectional variation in wages suggests another potential test of the golden goose effect: we would expect
_
to see officials taking more risk in locations where the market wage _
wis larger relative to the statutory wage w 
 . In
results available on request we find that rent extraction is indeed (insignificantly) higher in panchayats with lower
market wages, as predicted by their endowments of land and labor.
26
These figures are scaled to reflect misreporting of days worked as daily-wage projects when, in fact, they were
designated as piece-rate projects in the official data. In general, this kind of misreporting is rare: 82 percent of spells
are reported correctly, whereas 15 percent of piece-rate spells are reported as daily-wage spells.
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Table 2—Wage Shock Effects on Project Composition
Regressor
Shock
Day
Day2
District FEs
Observations
R2

(1)

(2)

0.014
(0.021)
0.001
(0.001)

0.007
(0.019)
0.001
(0.001)

N
12,103
0.046

Y
12,103
0.097

(3)

0.008
(0.018)
−0.003
(0.002)
0.002
(0.001)
Y
12,103
0.098

Notes: Each observation is a panchayat-day. The dependent variable in all regressions is
“FwdWageFrac,” the proportion of daily wage project-days in the panchayat in the next two
months. “Shock” is an indicator equal to 1 on and after May 1, 2007. “Day” is a linear time
trend; Day2 has been rescaled by the mean of Day. All columns include a third-order polynomial in the day of the month and indicators for major agricultural seasons. Robust standard
errors multi-way clustered by panchayat and day are presented in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

B. Overreporting of Days Worked in Daily-Wage Projects
We begin our core analysis by examining the reported number of days worked
on daily-wage projects. Figure 4 shows the evolution of overreporting over time—
i.e., the difference between the number of days of work reported by officials and by
households. Note that the sharp downward spikes generally occur on major holidays,
suggesting that officials perceive overreporting on holidays as particularly risky.
The superimposed fitted models summarize an exploratory regression-discontinuity
analysis: we fit polynomials in day-of-year to the aggregate time series and allowed
the coefficients to vary before and after the wage change took effect on May 1. The
fitted models suggest that there was a slight increase in daily-wage overreporting
following the shock. This may seem surprising given the obvious effect of the wage
hike on incentives for overreporting, but as Proposition 1 suggests there may also be
a countervailing dynamic effect.
Columns 1–3 in panel A of Table 3 present a disaggregated analysis based on
equation (3). Column 1 presents estimates of the basic specification (equation (3))
with a linear time trend and no location effects; column 2 adds district fixed effects,
while column 3 adds a linear trend interacted with the shock term. Consistently
across these specifications we find that official reports are significantly higher when
more actual work was done and, conditional on actual work done, significantly
lower on major holidays (not reported). The estimated impact of the wage shock,
on the other hand, is positive but not significant in each specification. To examine
whether this is due to an offsetting dynamic effect, columns 4–6 of panel A separate
panchayats that ran solely daily-wage projects from those that also ran piece-rate
projects (equation (5)). We find a differential reduction in overreporting in the dailywage only panchayats, significant at the 10 percent level; summing the point estimates implies a small reduction in overreporting in these locations. In contrast, the
estimated effect of the wage change in panchayats that ran at least some p iece-rate
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Figure 4. Daily Wage Corruption Measures with Discontinuous Polynomial Fits
Notes: Plots daily series of the total amount of overreporting of work days on daily wage projects. Day 60 corresponds to March 1, 2007, the start of the study period; day 121 to May 1,
2007, the date of the wage shock; and day 181 to June 30, 2007, the end of the study period.
Discrepancies were calculated by subtracting the quantities reported by survey respondents
from those reported in official records. Superimposed solid lines represent fitted regression discontinuity models with linear (panel A) and quadratic (panel B) terms in day-of-year; dotted
lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

projects is larger and significant in column 4. This suggests the presence of a substitution effect that is muting the overall impact of the wage change.
To further isolate the portion of this differential effect that is attributable to having future daily-wage projects, and in order to test Proposition 3, columns 1–3 of
panel B report estimates of the interaction between the wage shock and categories of
our constructed FwdWageFrac measure (equation (6)). The estimated direct effect
of the wage hike increases again and is significant at the 5 percent level; the interpretation is that this is the price effect that would obtain in a panchayat with no future
daily-wage projects planned. Note that this result also rules out a lternative explanation based on strong diminishing marginal returns to income, such as income “targeting.” The differential effect in panchayats with solely wage projects upcoming
is negative and significant at the 10 percent level, while the differential effect in
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Table 3—Wage Shock Effects on Daily-Wage Reports

Regressor

(1)

Panel A. Wage shock effects
Shock
0.95
(0.78)
Shock × AlwaysDW

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.94
(0.78)

0.89
(0.78)

12,810
0.09

12,810
0.09

1.30*
(0.79)
−1.75*
(1.00)
2.12**
(0.83)
12,810
0.09

1.29
(0.79)
−1.74*
(0.98)
2.27***
(0.86)
12,810
0.10

1.24
(0.80)
−1.75*
(0.99)
2.28***
(0.86)
12,810
0.10

2.31**
(0.96)
−1.84*
(1.07)
−1.12
(1.03)

2.25**
(0.95)
−1.80*
(1.07)
−1.08
(1.02)

3.00**
(1.23)
−3.78***
(1.36)
−0.17
(0.94)
2.13
(1.46)
−2.03**
(0.97)
10,651
0.14

3.00**
(1.23)
−3.78***
(1.37)
−0.17
(0.94)
2.12
(1.47)
−2.03**
(0.97)
10,651
0.14

Day
Y

Shock × Day
Y

AlwaysDW
Observations
R2

12,810
0.08

Panel B. Wage shock dynamic effects
Shock
2.39**
(0.95)
Shock × FdwAll
−1.94*
(1.07)
Shock × FdwSome
−1.15
(1.03)
Shock × BdwAll

Observations
R2

11,386
0.09

11,386
0.09

11,386
0.09

3.05**
(1.22)
−4.03***
(1.38)
−0.21
(0.94)
2.27
(1.50)
−1.99**
(0.94)
10,651
0.13

Time controls
District FEs

Day
N

Day
Y

Shock × Day
Y

Day
N

Shock × BdwSome

Notes: Each observation is a panchayat-day. The dependent variable in all regressions is the number of days of
daily-wage work officially reported. “Shock” is an indicator equal to one on and after May 1, 2007; in columns 3
and 6, it is the intercept difference at the time the shock occurs. “AlwaysDW” is a panchayat that had a daily-wage
project active throughout the study period. “FdwAll” is equal to one if the proportion of daily wage project-days in
the panchayat in the next two months is equal to 1, and “BdwAll” is the analogous variable for the preceding two
months. “FdwSome” is equal to 1 if the proportion of daily wage project-days in the next two months is greater than
0 but less than 1, and “BdwSome” is the analogous variable for the preceding two months. All regressions include
controls for the number of days of daily-wage work reported by participants, an indicator for major holidays, a
third-order polynomial in the day of the month, indicators for major agricultural seasons, and indicators for the panchayat chief seat being reserved for a minority group. Robust standard errors multi-way clustered by panchayat and
day are presented in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

panchayats with a mix of upcoming projects is negative but insignificant, providing
support for Proposition 3.27
To better understand what drives these patterns of substitution, columns 4–6 of
panel B present specifications that allow for both the future and the past to predict
responsiveness to the shock (equation (7)). The direct effect of the shock remains
positive and is significant. The differential change in corruption in panchayats
with only daily-wage projects upcoming is negative, larger, and highly significant,
27
One potential concern about these results is that intertemporal substitution occurs mechanically because of
the 100 day limit on participation per household-year. In practice, however, we found that this limit was rarely
reached. During fiscal year 2006–2007 only 4 percent of jobcards in our study area in Orissa reached 100 days, and
all panchayats in our sample had a significant number of jobcards with less than 100 days—95 percent of the cards
on average and at a minimum 22 percent.
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Figure 5. Piece Rate Corruption Measures with Discontinuous Polynomial Fits
Notes: Plots daily series of the total amount of theft on piece rate projects. Day 60 corresponds to
March 1, 2007, the start of the study period; day 121 to May 1, 2007, the date of the wage shock;
and day 181 to June 30, 2007, the end of the study period. Discrepancies were calculated by
subtracting the quantities reported by survey respondents from those reported in official records.
Superimposed solid lines represent fitted regression discontinuity models with linear (panel A) and
quadratic (panel B) terms in day-of-year; dotted lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

c onfirming a strong substitution pattern. The analogous differential change for panchayats that had only run daily-wage projects in the past is positive and insignificant,
which is inconsistent with time-symmetric interpretations of our forward-looking
estimates. We do estimate a significant negative differential effect in panchayats that
had implemented a mix of projects in the past, however. In contrast to the forwardlooking results, this result is not robust to replacing categories of the FwdWageFrac
variable with the variable itself in our empirical model (not reported). This, and the
fact that we do not find differential drops in panchayats with only wage projects in
the past, lead us to treat it with some caution.
C. Theft in Piece-Rate Projects
We turn next to theft from piece-rate projects. This margin of corruption provides an attractive test for golden goose effects because it was not directly affected
by the wage change, so that only dynamic effects should apply (Proposition 2).
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the gap between official and actual payments on
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Table 4—Wage Shock Effects on Piece-Rate Reports

Regressor

(1)

Panel A. Wage shock effects
Shock
−78.31**
(39.91)
Shock × AlwaysPR

(2)
−78.43*
(40.29)

(3)
−75.9*
(40.08)

AlwaysPR
Observations
 2
R

7,076
0.04

Panel B. Wage shock dynamic effects
Shock
−38.58
(67.50)
Shock × FdwAll
−24.88
(69.39)
Shock × FdwSome
−74.61
(72.18)
Shock × BdwAll

7,076
0.05

7,076
0.05

−40.47
(66.52)
−20.36
(67.39)
−73.94
(69.87)

−38.18
(67.18)
−23.75
(68.79)
−72.84
(69.81)

6,543
0.08
Day
Y

6,543
0.08

Shock × BdwSome
Observations
 2
R
Time controls
District FEs

6,543
0.08
Day
N

Shock×Day
Y

(4)

(5)

(6)

−81.76**
(40.26)
15.44
(50.43)
−35.29
(33.87)
7,076
0.04

−82.18**
(40.66)
16.64
(49.80)
−33.19
(34.83)
7,076
0.05

−79.87**
(40.58)
17.58
(49.36)
−33.58
(34.73)
7,076
0.05

−63.69
(73.19)
−44.14
(93.40)
−74.85
(95.70)
109.23
(81.61)
11.94
(89.23)
6,209
0.11
Day
N

−62.16
(72.35)
−31.83
(90.06)
−73.83
(94.34)
105.72
(81.84)
5.17
(89.35)
6,209
0.11
Day
Y

−60.53
(72.34)
−39.19
(93.11)
−73.46
(94.20)
113.68
(84.81)
8.55
(90.37)
6,209
0.12
Shock×Day
Y

Notes: Each observation is a panchayat-day. The dependent variable in all regressions is the total amount paid on
piece-rate projects officially reported. “Shock” is an indicator equal to 1 on and after May 1, 2007; in columns 3 and
6, it is the intercept difference at the time the shock occurs. “AlwaysPR” is a panchayat that had a piece rate project
active throughout the study period. “FdwAll” is equal to one if the proportion of daily wage project-days in the panchayat in the next two months is equal to 1, and “BdwAll” is the analogous variable for the preceding two months.
“FdwSome” is equal to 1 if the proportion of daily wage project-days in the next two months is greater than 0 but
less than 1, and “BdwSome” is the analogous variable for the preceding two months. All regressions include controls for the number of days of daily-wage work reported by participants, an indicator for major holidays, a thirdorder polynomial in the day of the month, indicators for major agricultural seasons, and indicators for the panchayat
chief seat being reserved for a minority group. Robust standard errors multi-way clustered by panchayat and day
are presented in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

piece-rate projects over the sample period, again with fitted regression-discontinuity
specifications superimposed. Theft was unusually low in May following the wage
shock; indeed, officially reported payments fell while actual payments rose. The fitted models reflect this, consistently estimating a significant discrete drop on May 1.
Note also that theft rebounded in June; while various factors could be at play, this is
also broadly consistent with a dynamic model since NREGS projects largely cease
operation during the monsoons starting in late June in Orissa. This implies that
future rent expectations were falling steadily through May and June.
Turning to a disaggregated analysis, Table 4 mirrors Table 3 but with the total
reported payments on piece-rate projects as the dependent variable and total actual
payments on piece-rate projects as a predictor. In column 1 of panel A, the main effect
of the wage shock is negative and significant at the 5 percent level, providing strong

Vol. 5 No. 4

niehaus and sukhtankar: corruption dynamics

255

support for Proposition 2. The magnitude of the coefficient—about Rs 78 per day—
is also economically meaningful compared to the average theft per panchayat-day
observation prior to the shock of Rs 102. Columns 2–3 show that while the coefficient does not change much, standard errors are slightly larger and the result is hence
significant at the 10 percent level. Columns 4–6 again separate those panchayats that
ran only piece-rate projects from those that ran both types of projects; as expected
the coefficient on the interaction terms is positive, though insignificant. The estimated change in panchayats with both kinds of projects is larger and more precisely
estimated. Note that the sum of the coefficient on the shock and the interaction term
is not statistically significantly different from zero, suggesting that the shock itself
had no effect on panchayats that only ran piece-rate projects.
As before, panel B adds interactions between the shock and the forward and
backward fraction of daily-wage projects. As with daily-wage overreporting we find
a negative differential effect of the shock in panchayats with all projects in the future
being daily wage, and a positive coefficient on the interaction between the shock
and past high daily-wage fractions. None of these estimates are statistically significant, however. In general our power to estimate piece-rate effects is limited by the
relative scarcity of piece-rate projects in Orissa. (For example, even the indicator
for holidays, which is consistently statistically significant in daily-wage models,
is imprecisely estimated in piece-rate models). Overall the estimated differential
effects provide only suggestive evidence.
To obtain a more powerful test for Proposition 2 and address concerns about
time-varying confounds we next use Andhra Pradesh as a control. Table 5 reports
estimates of equation (4), the difference-in-differences specification. The Orissaspecific effect of the daily-wage shock in Orissa is negative, larger than the
first-differences estimate, and significant across all specifications. Subject to the
caveats described above, these estimates support the golden goose hypothesis.
D. Robustness Checks
For our preferred estimators, we use the fraction of daily wage project-days in the
upcoming two months as the key interaction variable. A two-month window is sensible on several grounds. First, longer forecasts of project shelf composition would
not likely be relevant given that (i) the tenure of bureaucrats in the relevant postings is quite short (approximately a year), and (ii) very little NREGS activity takes
place once the monsoon season starts in earnest. Second, as per program guidelines
official reports are aggregated bi-weekly, so that it is plausible for an official to be
detected and punished within a two-month window. Nevertheless, columns 1 and 2
(6 and 7) of Table 6 examine the sensitivity of the daily-wage (piece-rate) results
to using one-month and three-month windows. Results using a one-month window
are similar and if anything stronger than our baseline estimates. Results using a
three-month window are somewhat smaller and not statistically significant but are
qualitatively similar, as one would expect if the three-month window absorbs large
periods of very little NREGS activity during the monsoon season.
Another issue has to do with the exact timing of the effects we are attributing to
the May 1 policy change. Equation (6) implicitly assumes that the dynamic effects
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Table 5—Effects on Piece-Rate Reports Using Andhra Pradesh as a Control
Regressor
OR Shock × OR
AP Shock 1 × AP
AP Shock 2 × AP
OR Shock
AP Shock 1
AP Shock 2
Actual PR payments
Time controls
FEs
Observations
R2

(1)

−87.86**
(38.81)
−21.29
(30.09)
117.84***
(33.87)
31.15
(32.51)
61.08**
(27.42)
−24.34
(25.89)
0.19**
(0.08)
Day
State
16,470
0.06

(2)

−87.90**
(38.77)
−21.45
(29.99)
117.95***
(33.83)
31.40
(32.38)
60.69**
(27.50)
−24.71
(25.85)
0.19**
(0.08)
Day
District
16,470
0.06

(3)

−87.54**
(38.86)
−21.03
(30.14)
119.38***
(34.05)
53.64
(32.88)
23.38
(25.78)
−63.81**
(26.00)
0.19**
(0.08)
Shock×Day
District
16,470
0.06

Notes: This table uses data from both Orissa (OR) and Andhra Pradesh (AP). Each observation is a panchayat-day. The dependent variable in all regressions is the total amount paid
out on piece-rate projects as officially reported. “OR Shock” is an indicator equal to 1 on and
after May 1, 2007; in column 3, it is the intercept difference at the time the shock occurs. “AP
Shock 1” is an indicator equal to one on and after March 5, 2007, while “AP Shock 2” equals
one on or after April 25, 2007. All columns include a third-order polynomial in the day of the
month, an indicator for major holidays, and indicators for major agricultural seasons. Robust
standard errors multi-way clustered by panchayat and day are presented in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

of the wage change take effect at the same point in time as the static ones. If, however, officials learned about the wage change before it took place then dynamic
effects might begin earlier than the direct, static ones. The May 1 wage change
we study was the culmination of a process that began on January 10 with the publication of a proposal to change wages, and it is possible that officials acquired
information over time about whether or not the proposal would be implemented.
To explore whether our causal interpretation of the coefficients on the post-May
indicator is correct we reran our main specifications using more flexible functions
of time. Columns 4 and 9 of Table 6 report results using indicators for each month
(we ran similar specifications using bi-weekly dummies and reached similar conclusions). In general the estimates are imprecise. There is some evidence—significant
for piece-rate theft—that the differential effect of FwdWageFrac categories (though
not the direct effect of the shock) begins earlier in April. This is consistent with the
view that at least some officials learned about the wage change before it took place
and began adjusting accordingly.
We have also examined the sensitivity of the results to allowing for quadratic trend
controls; an analogous set of tables in Appendix C reports these estimates (results
for even higher-order trend controls available on request). Higher-order polynomials
have little effect on any of our results. Another alternative interpretation is that the
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Table 6—Robustness Checks
Daily wage
Regressor
Shock
Shock × FdwAll
Shock × FdwSome
April

(1)

(2)

2.03**
1.69**
(0.89)
(0.84)
−1.75* −1.35
(0.99)
(1.04)
−1.28
−0.33
(0.92)
(0.98)

May
June
April × FdwAll
May × FdwAll
June × FdwAll
Time window (months)
Observations
R2

1
10,740
0.11

3
11,740
0.09

(3)

0.29
(1.25)
2.76
(1.77)
3.37
(2.24)
−0.35
(1.41)
−1.75
(1.71)
−2.60
(1.92)
2
11,386
0.09

Piece rate
(4)

2.44**
(0.97)
−1.94*
(1.09)
−1.19
(1.04)

2
11,386
0.04

(5)

(6)

−69.45 −26.96
(65.13) (75.21)
1.98 −44.15
(63.27) (77.92)
−51.87 −96.82
(64.72) (80.02)

1
6,250
0.09

(7)

−37.90

(8)
(67.03)
−22.86
(68.91)
−81.61
(72.31)

103.47
(67.50)
42.39
(76.83)
205.76
(154.60)
−125.72**
(57.67)
−39.77
(50.69)
−167.24
(119.43)
3
2
2
6,653
6,543
6,543
0.08
0.09
0.08

Notes: Each observation is a panchayat-day. The dependent variable in columns 1–3 is the number of days of dailywage work officially reported; in column 4, the difference between this quantity and the number of days of dailywage work reported by participants; in columns 5–7, the total amount paid out on piece-rate projects as officially
reported; and in column 8, the difference between this quantity and the total amount paid out on piece-rate projects
as reported by participants. “Shock” is an indicator equal to one on and after May 1, 2007. “FdwAll” is equal to one
if the proportion of daily wage project-days in the panchayat in the next two months is equal to 1. “FdwSome” is
equal to 1 if the proportion of daily wage project-days in the next two months is greater than 0 but less than 1. All
columns include controls for the actual quantities of work done/amounts received, a linear time trend, an indicator for major holidays, a third-order polynomial in the day of the month, indicators for major agricultural seasons,
and indicators for the panchayat chief seat being reserved for a minority group except columns 3 and 7 which omit
the polynomial in day-of-month. Robust standard errors multi-way clustered by panchayat and day are presented
in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

wage shock did have differential effects but that these were driven by other variables
correlated with project shelf composition. The leading concern in this context would
be a relationship with the reservation of key political posts for women or disadvantaged minorities. We checked earlier that shelf composition was not significantly
correlated with reservations, and these are also included as controls in all our specifications. We can further include interactions between reservation categories and the
wage change directly as controls in our regressions: this makes the daily-wage results
stronger, while leaving piece-rate results unchanged. (Results available on request).
  between official
Finally, we examine the effects of using the difference  y pt− ypt
and actual quantities as the dependent variable. Recall that this is equivalent to our
approach if the true relationship between those quantities is linear with slope one,
but otherwise is more restrictive. In practice, imposing that restriction makes little
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Table 7—Additional Outcome Variables
Daily wage

DW+PR
Regressor
Shock
Shock × FdwAll
Shock × FdwSome
Time controls
Fixed effects
Observations
R2

(1)

105.40
(82.45)
−73.79
(94.20)
−95.45
(95.29)
Day
District
12,103
0.04

(2)

138.55
(97.14)
−69.49*
(38.02)
−39.40
(36.79)
Day
District
11,386
0.04

(3)

174.64**
(77.29)
−192.76***
(36.61)
22.35
(69.19)
Shock×Day
District
10,651
0.08

(4)

1.21
(1.17)
−1.78**
(0.74)
0.08
(0.21)
Day
District
9,885
0.05

Piece rate
(5)

0.79
(0.84)
−0.88***
(0.33)
−0.26***
(0.03)
Day
District
10,433
0.03

(6)

−25.30
(39.99)
7.89
(80.37)
3.76
(53.23)
Day
District
5,614
0.08

(7)

−34.97
(48.18)
−5.96
(76.89)
−16.41
(36.14)
Day
District
5,828
0.06

Notes: Each observation is a panchayat-day. The dependent variable in column 1 is total extraction from daily-wage
and piece-rate projects. In columns 2–3 it is the total value extracted from daily-wage projects. In columns 4–7
it is the number of daily-wage work done or piece-rate amounts for “fictitious” households as officially reported.
“Shock” is an indicator equal to 1 on and after May 1, 2007. “FdwAll” is equal to 1 if the proportion of daily wage
project-days in the panchayat in the next two months is equal to 1, and “FdwSome” is equal to 1 if the proportion
of daily wage project-days in the next two months is greater than 0 but less than 1. All columns include controls for
the actual quantities of work done/amounts received, a linear time trend, an indicator for major holidays, a thirdorder polynomial in the day of the month, indicators for major agricultural seasons, and indicators for the panchayat
chief seat being reserved for a minority group. Robust standard errors multi-way clustered by panchayat and day
are presented in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

difference for the results (columns 4 and 8). We have also used the difference in total
amounts extracted as the dependent variables, and as Table 7 shows again the results
are very similar. This table also shows various other outcome variables: the total
rents combined from piece-rate and daily-wage projects, as well as official reports
for only “fictitious” households. The daily-wage results for the fictitious households
are strongly statistically significant.
E. Is Monitoring Affected?
Another potential concern is that the intensity with which officials were monitored by their supervisors changed around the same time as the daily-wage change.
If panchayats with more wage projects upcoming experienced the largest increases
in scrutiny this could explain the role of FwdWageFrac categories in predicting
responses to the wage shock. Of course, if this were true then again one would
expect BkWageFrac categories to play a similar role. Moreover, there is no a priori
reason to expect monitoring intensity to change: official notifications and instructions regarding the wage change did not include any provisions regarding monitoring, and officials at the block and panchayat level do not have implicit incentives
to monitor linked to the amount of corruption (for example, it is not the case that
a detecting official earns a reward proportional to the amount the detected official
stole). Nevertheless, one would like direct evidence on this point.
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To test for changes in monitoring we use data from our village-level survey on the
most recent visit to each village by the Block Development Officer (BDO) and the
District Collector, the two officials responsible for monitoring NREGS implementation at the panchayat level. Of course these visits could have been for planning as
well as monitoring purposes. In our Orissa sample, 62 percent of panchayats had a
BDO visit and 24 percent had a Collector visit since the beginning of the NREGS
in 2005. For these panchayats, we can test whether the likelihood of a visit went up
after May of 2007. Let t be the month in which a given panchayat was last visited
by an official.28 We suppose that the probability of the panchayat receiving a visit is
independent (but not identical) across months, as would be the case under optimal
monitoring with symmetric information. Let p(τ | θ, d) be the probability that a panchayat in district d receives a visit at time τ. Assume that p has the logit form
(8) 	

exp {δd + γ1 (t ≥ t  ∗) + f  (t)}
___
       .
p (t | θ, d) =     
1 + exp {δd  + γ1(t ≥ t  ∗) + f  (t)}

If we had data on all official visits, then we could estimate p( ⋅ | θ, d) directly. Because
we only observe the date of the most recent visit, we focus instead on the probability
that the panchayat’s last visit was at time t :
(9) 	

T

f  (t | θ, d) = p (t | θ, d ) · ∏ ( 1 − p (τ | θ, d )).
τ =t+1

Similarly, the probability that a panchayat did not receive a visit since the beginning
of the NREGS is
T

∏ ( 1 − p (τ | θ, d )),
(10) 	
τ =_t

where _t is the NREGS start date. We estimate this model via maximum likelihood
for both BDOs and Collectors and for various specifications of p, in each case testing the γ = 0. Table 8 reports the results. The estimate of γ is positive but small and
insignificant for BDOs; for collectors it is positive and insignificant when controlling linearly for time and is significantly negative when controlling for a quadratic in
time. In short, we find no evidence of an increase in monitoring intensity associated
with the change in the daily wage.29

28
In a small number of panchayats respondents could only remember the year, and not the month, of the most
recent visit by an official. We allow these observations to contribute to the likelihood function by simply calculating the probability that the most recent visit fell in the given year. Our results are insensitive to omitting these
observations.
29
One natural question is how closely officials’ expectations of changes in monitoring intensity corresponded to
actual changes. While we cannot directly measure their beliefs, we can examine changes in monitoring surrounding
earlier wages changes, which arguably shed light on what officials might reasonably have expected following the
May 1, 2007 reform. We estimated models analogous to those in Table 8 for two earlier reforms, a February 2006
daily-wage increase and an April 2006 piece-rate increase. We find that the estimated impact of these reforms (not
reported) on visit probabilities is negative in all but one specification. We read these results as suggestive that officials should, if anything, have expected a small reduction in monitoring.
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Table 8—ML Estimates of Changing Audit Probabilities over Time
Regressor
Shock
Koraput
Gajapati
Rayagada
Day
Day2

BDO

BDO

Collector

Collector

0.049
(0.304)
−3.007
(0.179)***
−4.771
(0.242)***
−3.872
(0.168)***
0.082
(0.017)***

0.07
(0.322)
−2.996
(0.187)***
−4.761
(0.246)***
−3.862
(0.174)***
0.082
(0.018)***
0
(0.001)

0.105
(0.482)
−4.769
(0.276)***
−5.742
(0.39)***
−5.425
(0.284)***
0.048
(0.024)*

−1.597
(0.753)**
−4.854
(0.274)***
−5.83
(0.389)***
−5.51
(0.283)***
0.147
(0.038)***
0.007
(0.002)***

Notes: This table presents maximum likelihood estimates of the probability of a visit by government officials—Block Development Officers (BDO) and District Collectors—to the panchayat. “Shock” is an indicator equal to 1 on and after May 1, 2007. “t” and “t  2” are time
trends. Koraput, Rayagada, and Gajapati are indicators for the three study districts in Orissa.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

F. Interpreting Magnitudes
Given the confidence intervals around some of our coefficients, their magnitudes
should be interpreted cautiously. With that caveat in mind we provide two calculations as benchmarks. First, we compare the actual increase in theft due to the shock
to the counterfactual effect of a temporary wage hike without golden goose effects.
We estimate that the permanent increase in daily wages that we study raised theft by
64 percent less than a temporary increase of the same magnitude would have, indicating that golden goose effects had a substantial “dampening” effect.30 However,
the 90 percent confidence interval around that estimate is 8–120 percent, suggesting
that this number must be interpreted with caution. Second, we compare the magnitude of golden goose effects to the effects of other anti-corruption interventions
studied in the literature. We estimate that the dynamic effects of the wage change
lowered daily-wage overreporting and piece-rate theft by 49 percent and 77 percent, respectively.31 These are meaningful effect sizes in comparison with other estimates from the literature. For example, Olken (2007) estimates that increasing the
30
We estimate the actual increase in theft due to the shock as the sum of three components: (i) a mechanical
component equal to the predicted quantity of daily-wage overreporting absent the shock multiplied by the change in
the average daily wage, (ii) a behavioral response in daily-wage overreporting, which we estimate using the coefficients from column 2, panel B of Table 3, and (iii) a negative behavioral response in piece-rate theft, estimated using
the coefficient in column 2, panel A of Table 4 (a conservative assumption given that the difference-in-differences
estimates of the latter effect are larger). We sum these effects to obtain an estimate Δ
 actualof the total effect of the
shock on rent extraction. To construct a counterfactual estimate of the effect Δcounterof a temporary wage hike, we
perform a similar calculation but omit the contributions of the piece-rate regressions and the forward-looking interΔcounter− Δactual
action term in the daily-wage regressions. Putting these pieces together, we estimate  _
  
= 64 percent.
Δcounter
31
We estimate golden goose effects on daily-wage overreporting as the interaction coefficient from column 2,
panel B of Table 3 multiplied by the average fraction of future projects that are daily wage, divided by mean
daily-wage overreporting prior to the shock. Similarly, we estimate golden goose effects on piece-rate theft as the
coefficient in column 2, panel A of Table 4 divided by mean piece-rate theft prior to the shock.
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p robability of audit from 4 percent to 100 percent reduced corruption on Indonesian
road projects by 30 percent; Ferraz and Finan (2011) estimate that Brazilian mayors
who are eligible for reelection misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than those
who are not.
For policy purposes it would be informative to conduct a complete calibration
of our model. Unfortunately this is infeasible without richer data on all the sources
of rent which a corrupt official would lose if suspended or fired, and the value of
their outside options. We can, however, provide some sense of whether NREGS
rents are a significant source of income relative to licit compensation. We estimate
total NREGS rents per panchayat (or block) per month by calculating the difference between actual and reported payments in our sample multiplied by the inverse
of the sampling probability, and compare these to sarpanch honorariums and BDO
salaries as per the Government of Orissa’s payscales (based on sixth Central Pay
Commission). The contrasts are stark. The estimated rate of rent extraction per panchayat is roughly 150 times the rate at which sarpanchs are compensated, and the
rate per block is 1,100 times the rate at which Block Development Officers are
compensated. These figures clearly suggest that optimal contracts should take the
influence of illicit rents into account.
V. Conclusion

Dismissal, suspension, and transfer are standard tools for disciplining corrupt
agents. We show that these incentives generate a “golden goose” effect: as steadystate opportunities to extract rent increase the value of continuing in office increases
and this induces agents to act more cautiously. This dynamic mechanism tends to
dampen, and may reverse, the predictions of static models.
We test for golden goose effects using panel data on corruption in India’s National
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, exploiting an exogenous increase in program
wages to construct tests. We find two forms of evidence consistent with our theory:
higher daily wages lead to lower theft from piece-rate projects, and differentially
lower theft in areas with a higher proportion of daily-wage projects upcoming. Rough
calculations based on the point estimates imply that these effects reduced the increase
in corruption generated by the wage change by approximately 64 percent. Future
work might focus on the longer-term implications of this effect for rent extraction.
Appendix
A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
The official’s problem during daily-wage periods is
_

_

_ _

 , ϕ) ].
 	 max  [ (w  − w  t  )nt + ( n  − nt  ) w  + β ( 1 − π ( n , nt  )) V (w 
 n 

The posited attributes
_ _of π ensure that this problem has an_interior solution satisfy_
 (w 
 , ϕ). Differentiating with respect to w 
 yields
ing w 
 = β π n ( n , nt  )V 
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∂  n 
 	 _
_ 
∂  w 

_

∂ V 
_
1 − β  π n   _
∂  w 
=  _
  
  
   .
_ _
βπ n  n  V (w 
 , ϕ)

Substitution in the first-order condition yields
∂  n 
 	 _
_ 
∂  w 

_

_

w 
_ _
_
   ∂ V 
1 −  _
V 
 ∂  w 
_
=     
 ,
_ _
β π n  n  V (w 
 , ϕ)

from which (and π n  n > 0) the result is apparent.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The official’s problem during piece-rate periods is
_

_ _

_

 , ϕ) ].
 	max [ (r  − r  t  ) q  t + ( q  − q  t  ) r  + β ( 1 − μ ( q , q  t  )) V (w 
 q 

The posited attributes of μ ensure that this problem
solution satisfy_ _ has an interior
_
_ t t
t

 (w 
 , ϕ). Since (r , r  , q  ) are fixed we
ing the Kuhn-Tucker condition r 
 = βμ q ( q , q    )V 
_
_
 yields
know that  q   t r  − q  tr  tmoves with  q   t. Differentiating with respect to w 
∂  q 
 	 _
_ 
∂  w 

_

∂ V 
_
−βμ q   _
∂  w 
_
=     
 .
_ _
βμ q  q  V (w 
 , ϕ)
_

∂ V 
_ > 0. By the envelope theorem
Since μ q  q > 0, it is sufficient to show  _
∂  w 
_

_

_

∂ V (w , 1, ϕ)
∂ V(w , 1, ϕ)
∂ V 
_
_
 	 _
_   = ϕ    
_   + (1 − ϕ)  
_ 
∂  w 
∂  w 
∂  w 

_

∂ V 
= ϕ n  + β [ ϕ ( 1 − π ( n , n  )) + (1 − ϕ)( 1 − μ ( q , q  ))  ]  _
_ 
∂  w 
t

t

ϕ n 
____
  > 0.
   
     
= 
t
1 − β [ ϕ ( 1 − π ( n , n  )) + (1 − ϕ)( 1 − μ ( q , q  t))  ]
Proof of Proposition 3:
_ _
Let θ = (ϕ, w , r ) represent the full set of parameters, and Θ the parameter space,
which is closed and bounded by assumption. After some algebra,
∂  n 
 
    = A (θ) + B (θ) z (θ)
[_
∂  w  ]

∂
 	 _  
∂ϕ
with

_
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_

−w  
 n 
___
A(θ) =    
    
 
_
(β π n  n  V   )( ϕ yo  (1) + (1 − ϕ) yo(0))
_

 ϕ n 
w 
___
B(θ) =    
    
  
_
(βπ n  n  V )( ϕ yo(1) + (1 − ϕ)yo(0))2 

(

_

_

)(

π

)

w 
_ _
_  n   + β π n  n   
_    β π n  n  n   _
 1 −  _
  ∂ V 
V 
 ∂  w 
V 
 π n  n 
 
+  _____
    
      
_
2
t
(β π n  n  V )( 1 − β [ ϕ ( 1 − π ( n , n  )) + (1 − ϕ)( 1 − μ ( q , q  t  ))  ]  )

z (θ) = yo  (1) − yo  (0).

All these functions are assumed smoothly continuous. Fix ϵ > 0, define Θ(ϵ)
≡ {θ ∈ Θ : | z(θ) | < ϵ}, and
 	U 
(ϵ) ≡  sup   A (θ) +   sup   B (θ) · ϵ.
θ∈Θ(ϵ)

θ∈Θ(ϵ)

∂_
 n 
Then | z(θ) | < ϵ implies _
  ∂∂ϕ [ _
  ∂  
   ≤ U(ϵ). Since Θ is closed and bounded and A(θ) < 0
w  ]

  A(θ) < 0.
for any fixed, finite θ we must have sup θ∈Θ  A(θ) < 0, and so limϵ→0supθ∈Θ(ϵ)

  B(θ) · ϵ = 0.
Meanwhile since Θ(ϵ) shrinks with ϵ we must have limϵ→0supθ∈Θ(ϵ)
∂ _
∂_
 n 
_
Hence for ϵ sufficiently small  ∂ ϕ [   ∂  w    ] ≤ U(ϵ) < 0. The same argument holds for
∂  q 
_
_    with
  ∂  w 
  ∂∂ϕ  _

[ ]

−μ q   n 
 	A(θ) =  _
  q  q  
μ


−μ q    ϕ n 
  
   2  
 	B (θ) =  ___
μ q   q  ( ϕyo  (1) + (1 − ϕ) yo  (0)) 

−μ q    (μ q  q    − μ q    μ q   q  q )
 
−  _____
    
      
3 _2
μ q  q   V  ( 1 − β [ ϕ ( 1 − π ( n , nt  )) + (1 − ϕ)( 1 − μ ( q , q  t  ))  ]  )
2

 	z (θ) = 
yo  (1) − yo  (0).
_

_

As before, (r , r  t, q  t  ) fixed imply that  q   t r  − q  t r  tmoves with  q   t.
B. Survey Results and Sample Description
We interviewed households during January and February 2008. Given the sensitive nature of the survey, and the dangers inherent in surveying in a region beset
with Maoist insurgents, conflict between mining conglomerates and the local tribal
population, and tensions between evangelical Christian missionaries and right-wing
Hindu activists, our surveyors were asked not to enter villages if they felt threatened
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Table B1—Characteristics of Spells in Sample Frame, Initial Sample, and Reached Sample
All spells

Sampled spells

Reached spells

Variable

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

p-value

Age
Male
SC/ST
Post
Spell length
Wage spell
Daily rate

37.60
0.54
0.78
0.40
11.13
0.83
63.48

14.93
0.50
0.41
0.49
2.92
0.37
17.24

37.37
0.54
0.79
0.43
11.14
0.83
64.37

13.60
0.50
0.41
0.49
3.01
0.38
20.34

37.55
0.54
0.77
0.42
11.09
0.84
63.90

13.28
0.50
0.42
0.49
3.14
0.36
18.92

0.33
0.67
0.05
0.57
0.33
0.20
0.30

Notes: Reports summary statistics at the work-spell level using official records and for (i) the universe of spells
sampled from (N = 111,172), (ii) the initial sample of work spells we drew (N = 7,126), and (iii) the work spells
done by households we were ultimately able to interview (N = 4,794). The last column reports the p-value from a
regression of the variable in question on an indicator for whether or not the observation is in our analysis sample
(conditional on being in our initial sample), with standard errors clustered at the panchayat level.

in any way.32 We could not perfectly predict trouble spots in advance, hence out of
the original sample of 1,938 households, we were unable to even attempt to reach
439. The main obstacles were an incident which caused tensions between a mining
company and locals in Rayagada and a polite request by Maoist rebels (“Naxals”)
not to enter certain areas of Koraput. As Table B1 shows, the differences between
the initial sample and the analysis sample generated by this attrition are reassuringly
small and generally insignificant. Particularly important, there is no difference in the
rate at which we reached households that worked before or after the wage change.
The one significant difference is the fraction of spells performed by members of a
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, which is higher in the initial sample because
the factors related to violence were concentrated in tribal areas. Values for the frame
and initial sample are essentially identical by design.
Of the 1,499 households we did attempt to reach, we managed to reach or confirm the nonexistence/permanent migration/death of 1,408 households. In order to
determine whether an individual/household that was included in the official records
was actually nonexistent or dead or no longer lived in the village, we asked surveyors to confirm the status with three neighbors who were willing to supply their
names on the survey. Households who match these stringent standards are included
in the analysis as fictitious. We exclude from the analysis 91 households whose status we could not verify, who were temporarily away, or who declined to participate.
Of the 1,328 households in which we completed interviews, only 821 confirmed having a household member who worked on an NREGS project during the
period we asked about.33 Those households that actually worked on NREGS are
32
A number of people have been threatened, beaten, and even murdered for investigating NREGS corruption,
including an activist killed in May 2008 in one of our sampled Panchayats. See, for example, an article in the Hindu
describing the dangers facing NGO activists working on NREGS issues: http://www.thehindu.com/2008/05/22/
stories/2008052253871000.htm. For an account of an armed Maoist attack on a police armament depot in a
neighboring district see http://www.thehindu.com/2008/02/17/stories/2008021757890100.htm. For an account of
Christian-Hindu tension see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7486252.stm.
33
Since we had exact descriptions of the projects—e.g., “farm pond construction near main road X in village
Y and Panchayat Z ”—we are confident that respondents could distinguish between NREGS projects and other
projects.
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Table B2—Sample Description
NREGA participants
Variable

Nonparticipants

Observations

Mean

SD

Observations

Mean

SD

Demographics
Number of HH members
BPL card holder
HH head is literate
HH head educated through grade 10

812
815
803
819

4.94
0.77
0.3
0.04

1.88
0.42
0.46
0.19

498
497
501
502

4.65
0.76
0.23
0.04

2.18
0.43
0.42
0.2

Awareness
Knows HH keeps job card
Number of amenities aware of
HH head has heard of RTI Act

806
810
821

0.84
0.96
0.02

0.37
0.85
0.13

476
494
501

0.89
0.78
0.01

0.31
0.82
0.09

Notes: This table describes attributes of the household survey sample that was successfully interviewed in Orissa.
The sample is split between households who confirm that they worked on an NREGA project between March 1 and
June 30, 2007—821 households (NREGA participants)—and those that did not (507 households). “BPL” stands
for Below the Poverty Line, a designation that entitles one to several government programs, although makes no difference for NREGA work. The definition for literacy used by the Indian government is whether one can sign her
name (instead of placing a thumbprint). The amenities meant to be provided at the worksite in NREGA projects
are—amongst others—water, shade, first aid, and a creche/child care. We ask respondents to name amenities without prompting. “RTI” stands for the Right to Information Act, a freedom of information act passed by the Indian
government in 2005.

very similar to those that did not. In general, the sample is poor, uneducated, and
uninformed, even when compared to averages across India or Orissa. Seventyseven percent of households possess Below Poverty Line cards, only 27 percent of
household heads are “literate” (able to write their names), and almost no one has
heard of the Right to Information Act (which entitles citizens to request copies of
most government records).
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C. Additional Appendix Tables
Table C1—Numerical Example of Dependent Variable Construction
Attributed work by day
Worker

Report

A
B

3 days between May 1–6
4 days from May 3–6

May 1

May 2

May 3

May 4

May 5

May 6

0.5
0

0.5
0

0.5
1

0.5
1

0.5
1

0.5
1

0.5

0.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

Totals:

Notes: This table presents numerical examples of how our dependent variables were aggregated up to the panchayat-day level from official and survey reports of work done. The rows show two typical reports of work done
within a panchayat; the columns show how we attributed the number of days reported as worked across the period
during which they were worked, and summed them up for each panchayat-day record.

Table C2—Wage Shock Effects on Daily-Wage Reports, Quadratic Time Trends
Regressor

(1)

Panel A. Wage shock effects
Shock
0.88
(0.78)
Shock × AlwaysDW

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.88
(0.79)

1.04
(0.98)

12,810
0.09

12,810
0.09

1.23
(0.79)
−1.75*
(1.01)
2.14**
(0.84)
12,810
0.09

1.23
(0.80)
−1.75*
(0.99)
2.28***
(0.86)
12,810
0.10

2.22**
(0.95)
−1.76*
(1.06)
−1.05
(1.02)

2.28*
(1.26)
−1.78*
(1.06)
−1.03
(1.02)

11,386
0.10
Day2
Y

11,386
0.10

3.01**
(1.24)
−3.90***
(1.40)
−0.17
(0.94)
2.17
(1.51)
−2.01**
(0.95)
10,651
0.13
Day2
N

2.97**
2.97*
(1.24)
(1.53)
−3.71***
−3.70***
(1.38)
(1.35)
−0.15
−0.11
(0.94)
(0.94)
2.07
2.10
(1.47)
(1.44)
−2.04**
−2.01**
(0.98)
(0.94)
10,651
10,651
0.14
0.14
Day2
Shock×Day2
Y
Y

AlwaysDW
Observations
R2

12,810
0.08

Panel B. Wage shock dynamic effects
Shock
2.28**
(0.94)
Shock × FdwAll
−1.83*
(1.07)
Shock × FdwSome
−1.07
(1.02)
Shock × BdwAll
Shock × BdwSome
Observations
R2
Time controls
District FEs

11,386
0.09
Day2
N

Shock×Day2
Y

(5)

(6)
1.40
(0.94)
−1.73*
(0.99)
2.27***
(0.86)
12,810
0.10

Notes: Each observation is a panchayat-day. The dependent variable in all regressions is the number of days of
daily-wage work officially reported. “Shock” is an indicator equal to 1 on and after May 1, 2007; in columns 3 and 6,
it is the intercept difference at the time the shock occurs. “AlwaysDW” is a panchayat that had a daily-wage project
active throughout the study period. “FdwAll” is equal to 1 if the proportion of daily wage project-days in the panchayat in the next two months is equal to 1, and “BdwAll” is the analogous variable for the preceding two months.
“FdwSome” is equal to 1 if the proportion of daily wage project-days in the next two months is greater than 0 but
less than 1, and “BdwSome” is the analogous variable for the preceding two months. All regressions include controls for the number of days of daily-wage work reported by participants, an indicator for major holidays, a thirdorder polynomial in the day of the month, indicators for major agricultural seasons, and indicators for the panchayat
chief seat being reserved for a minority group. Robust standard errors multi-way clustered by panchayat and day
are presented in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table C3—Wage Shock Effects on Piece-Rate Reports, Quadratic Time Trends
Regressor
Panel A. Wage shock effects
Shock
Shock × AlwaysPR

(1)

(2)

(3)

−78.02*
(40.02)

−77.69*
(40.25)

7,076
0.04

7,076
0.05

7,076
0.05

−39.62
(66.82)
−22.54
(68.47)
−73.74
(69.9)

−83.01
(73.64)
−20.67
(67.62)
−69.65
(69.30)

−107.05*
(59.55)

AlwaysPR
Observations
R2

Panel B. Wage shock dynamic effects
Shock
−37.46
(67.85)
Shock × FdwAll
−27.71
(70.79)
Shock × FdwSome
−74.57
(72.20)
Shock × BdwAll
Shock × BdwSome
Observations
R2
Time controls
District FEs

6,543
0.08
Day2
N

6,543
0.08
Day2
Y

(4)

(5)

(6)

−81.48**
(40.38)
15.56
(50.35)
−35.38
(33.82)
7,076
0.04

−81.52**
(40.67)
16.98
(49.60)
−33.32
(34.78)
7,076
0.05

−111.41**
(56.18)
18.41
(48.96)
−34.25
(34.62)
7,076
0.06

−61.93
(72.47)
−37.42
(92.82)
−74.54
(94.64)
111.48
(84.62)
8.19
(90.69)
6,209
0.12
Day2
Y

−100.15
(84.32)
−36.27
(91.82)
−69.08
(93.13)
115.15
(84.54)
4.83
(89.31)
6,209
0.12

−63.16
(73.25)
−50.13
(96.55)
−75.65
(96.15)
114.07
(84.33)
14.69
(90.81)
6,543
6,209
0.09
0.11
Day2
Shock×Day2
Y
N

Shock×Day2
Y

Notes: Each observation is a panchayat-day. The dependent variable in all regressions is the total amount paid on
piece-rate projects officially reported. “Shock” is an indicator equal to 1 on and after May 1, 2007; in columns 3 and
6, it is the intercept difference at the time the shock occurs. “AlwaysPR” is a panchayat that had a piece rate project
active throughout the study period. “FdwAll” is equal to 1 if the proportion of daily wage project-days in the panchayat in the next two months is equal to 1, and “BdwAll” is the analogous variable for the preceding two months.
“FdwSome” is equal to 1 if the proportion of daily wage project-days in the next two months is greater than 0 but
less than 1, and “BdwSome” is the analogous variable for the preceding two months. All regressions include controls for the number of days of daily-wage work reported by participants, an indicator for major holidays, a thirdorder polynomial in the day of the month, indicators for major agricultural seasons, and indicators for the panchayat
chief seat being reserved for a minority group. Robust standard errors multi-way clustered by panchayat and day
are presented in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table C4—Effects on Piece-Rate Reports
Using Andhra Pradesh as a Control, Quadratic Time Trends
(1)

Regressor
OR Shock × OR
AP Shock 1 × AP
AP Shock 2 × AP
OR Shock
AP Shock 1
AP Shock 2
Actual PR payments
Time controls
FEs
Observations
R2

−87.39**
(38.94)
−21.10
(30.29)
119.97***
(34.13)
52.21
(32.00)
−3.47
(26.52)
−63.85***
(24.27)
0.20**
(0.08)
Day2
State
16,470
0.06

(2)

−87.31**
(38.92)
−21.24
(30.18)
120.03***
(34.10)
52.51
(31.94)
−3.57
(26.43)
−63.91***
(24.22)
0.20**
(0.08)
Day2
District
16,470
0.06

(3)

−86.87**
(38.93)
−23.30
(30.18)
119.74***
(34.08)
−35.07
(43.97)
18.89
(22.00)
−44.79
(27.81)
0.20**
(0.08)
Shock×Day2
District
16,470
0.07

Notes: This table uses data from both Orissa (OR) and Andhra Pradesh (AP). Each observation is a panchayat-day. The dependent variable in all regressions is the total amount paid
out on piece-rate projects as officially reported. “OR Shock” is an indicator equal to 1 on and
after May 1, 2007; in column 3, it is the intercept difference at the time the shock occurs. “AP
Shock 1” is an indicator equal to 1 on and after March 5, 2007, while “AP Shock 2” equals 1 on
or after April 25, 2007. All columns include a third-order polynomial in the day of the month,
an indicator for major holidays, and indicators for major agricultural seasons. Robust standard
errors multi-way clustered by panchayat and day are presented in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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